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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Organized crime and illegal economies generate multiple 
threats to states and societies. But although the negative 
effects of high levels of pervasive street and organized crime 
on human security are clear, the relationships between 
human security, crime, illicit economies, and law 
enforcement are highly complex. By sponsoring illicit 
economies in areas of state weakness where legal economic 
opportunities and public goods are seriously lacking, both 
belligerent and criminal groups frequently enhance some 
elements of human security of the marginalized populations 
who depend on illicit economies for basic livelihoods.  
 
Even criminal groups without a political ideology often have 
an important political impact on the lives of communities 
and on their allegiance to the State. Criminal groups also 
have political agendas. Both belligerent and criminal groups 
can develop political capital through their sponsorship of 
illicit economies. The extent of their political capital is 
dependent on several factors. 
 
Efforts to defeat belligerent groups by decreasing their 
financial flows through the suppression of an illicit economy 
are rarely effective. Such measures, in turn, increase the 
political capital of anti-State groups. 
 
The effectiveness of anti-money laundering measures (AML) 
also remains low and is often highly contingent on specific 
vulnerabilities of the target. The design of AML measures 
has other effects, such as on the size of a country‟s informal 
economy. 
 
Multifaceted anti-crime strategies that combine law 
enforcement approaches with targeted socio-economic 
policies and efforts to improve public goods provision, 
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including access to justice, are likely to be more effective in 
suppressing crime than tough nailed-fist approaches. For 
anti-crime policies to be effective, they often require a 
substantial, but politically-difficult concentration of 
resources in target areas.   In the absence of effective law 
enforcement capacity, legalization and decriminalization 
policies of illicit economies are unlikely on their own to 
substantially reduce levels of criminality or to eliminate 
organized crime. 
 
Effective police reform, for several decades largely elusive 
in Latin America, is one of the most urgently needed policy 
reforms in the region. Such efforts need to be coupled with 
fundamental judicial and correctional systems reforms.  Yet, 
regional approaches cannot obliterate the so-called balloon 
effect. If demand persists, even under intense law 
enforcement pressures, illicit economies will relocate to 
areas of weakest law enforcement, but they will not be 
eliminated.  
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INTRODUCTION  
 
Organized crime and illegal economies generate multiple 
threats to States and societies. They often threaten public 
safety, and at times, even national security. Extensive illicit 
economies can compromise the political systems by 
increasing corruption and penetration by criminal entities, 
undermine the legal economies, and eviscerate their judicial 
and law enforcement capacity. 
 
Yet, although the negative effects of high levels of pervasive 
street and organized crime on human security are clear, the 
relationships between human security, crime, illicit 
economies, and law enforcement are highly complex. Human 
security includes not only physical safety from violence and 
crime, but also economic safety from critical poverty, social 
marginalization, and fundamental delivery of elemental 
social and public goods, such as infrastructure, education, 
health care, and justice. Latin American governments have 
been chronically struggling to provide all these public goods 
in both the rural and urban areas.  
 
Multifaceted institutional weaknesses are at the core of why 
the relationship between illegality, crime, and human 
security is so complex. By sponsoring illicit economies in 
areas of state weakness where legal economic opportunities 
and public goods are seriously lacking, both belligerent and 
criminal groups frequently enhance some elements of human 
security of those marginalized populations who depend on 
illicit economies for basic livelihoods, even while 
compromising other aspects of their human security. At the 
same time, simplistic law enforcement measures can and 
frequently do further degrade human security. These 
pernicious dynamics become especially severe in the context 
of violent conflict. 
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Thus,  even criminal groups without a political ideology 
often have an important political impact on the lives of 
communities and on their allegiance to the State. They also 
often have political agendas, even without having an 
ideology. Consequently, discussions of whether a group is a 
criminal group or a political one or whether belligerents are 
motivated by profit, ideology, or grievances are frequently 
overstated in their significance for devising policy responses. 
 
In cases of State weakness and under provision of public 
goods, increased action by law enforcement agencies to 
suppress intense organized crime and illicit economies rarely 
is a sufficient response. Effective State response requires that 
the state address all the complex reasons why populations 
turn to illegality, including law enforcement deficiencies and 
physical insecurity, economic poverty, and social 
marginalization.  Such efforts entail ensuring that peoples 
and communities will obey laws and increasing the 
likelihood that illegal behavior and corruption will be 
punished.  Similarly, it is important to create a social, 
economic, and political environment in which the laws are 
consistent with the needs of the people; therefore, they can 
be seen as legitimate and can be internalized.  
 
This paper provides an overview of the dynamics of the 
crime-insecurity nexus and its complex impacts on State 
security and human security.  It also outlines elements of a 
multifaceted response derived from an analytical approach. 
Finally, it sketches key developments in U.S. policy 
pertaining to counternarcotics and anti-crime policies in 
Latin America during the Obama Administration and 
outlines implementation challenges. 
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THE THREATS FROM ILLICIT ECONOMIES AND THE 
DYNAMICS OF THE CRIME-INSECURITY NEXUS 
 
Extensive criminality and illicit economies generate multiple 
threats to States and societies. They corrupt the political 
system, by providing an avenue for criminal organizations to 
enter the political space, undermining democratic 
processes. Political entrepreneurs, who enjoy the financial 
and political resources generated by their connections to 
illicit economies, frequently experience great success in 
politics. They are able to secure official positions of power 
as well as wield influence from behind the scenes. The 
problem perpetuates itself as successful politicians 
bankrolled with illicit money make it more difficult for other 
actors to resist participating in the illicit economy, leading to 
endemic corruption at both the local and national levels. 
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Haiti are cases in point.  
 
Large illicit economies dominated by powerful traffickers 
also have pernicious effects on a country’s law 
enforcement and judicial systems. As the illicit economy 
grows, the investigative capacity of the law enforcement and 
judicial systems diminishes. Impunity for criminal activity 
increases, undermining the credibility and deterrence effects 
of law enforcement, the judicial system, and government 
authority. Powerful traffickers frequently turn to violent 
means to discourage prosecution, killing or bribing 
prosecutors, judges, and witnesses. Colombia in the late 
1980s and Mexico today are powerful reminders of the 
corruption and paralysis of law enforcement as a result of 
extensive criminal networks and the devastating effects of 
high levels of violent criminality on the judicial system. The 
profound collapse and penetration by criminal entities of 
Guatemala‟s judicial system led the country to embrace a 
special U.N. body, the International Commission Against 
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Impunity in Guatemala (CIGIG), to help its judiciary combat 
organized crime and state corruption.  
 
The intense criminality experienced in the region is, 
however, only exacerbating the preexisting poor quality of 
rule of law in Latin America.   Judicial systems across Latin 
America have been traditionally deficient: Justice is rarely 
equally available to all, is often painful slow, and convictions 
for violent crimes are infrequent. Powerful elites frequently 
enjoy a great deal of impunity, even as many former military 
dictators have been brought to justice. 
 
Illicit economies also have large and complex economic 
effects. Drug cultivation and processing, for example, 
generate employment for the poor rural populations and can 
even facilitate upward mobility. They can have powerful 
microeconomic spillover effects by boosting overall 
economic activity. But a burgeoning drug economy also 
contributes to inflation and can harm legitimate, export-
oriented, import-substituting industries as well as tourism. It 
encourages real estate speculation and undermines currency 
stability. It also displaces legitimate production. Since the 
drug economy is more profitable than legal production, 
requires less security and infrastructure, and imposes smaller 
sunk and transaction costs, the local population is frequently 
uninterested in, or unable to, participate in other (legal) kinds 
of economic activity. The presence of a large-scale illicit 
economy can thus lead to a form of the so-called Dutch 
disease where a boom in an isolated sector of the economy 
causes or is accompanied by stagnation in other core sectors 
since it gives rise to appreciation of land and labor costs. In 
Mexico, for example, the drug violence has not only 
undermined human security and public safety, but also 
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decreased tourism in violence affected areas, even as U.S. 
firms continue to invest there.
1
 
 
Most importantly, burgeoning and unconstrained drug 
production and other illicit economies and organized crime 
have profound negative consequences not only for local 
stability, security, and public safety.  They often impact 
national security.  
 
There are at least two distinct conceptual frameworks for 
analyzing the nexus of illicit economies, criminality, and 
violent conflict. The different conceptualizations of the 
phenomenon by these two analytical frameworks also lead to 
different policy prescriptions.  
 
Analytical Approach I: Belligerents Involved in Illicit 
Economies Become Mere Criminals and Criminals do not 
have Political Objectives 
Informed by both various strands of academic literature, such 
as works on narcoterrorism, the “greed” literature on civil 
wars, works on the crime-terror nexus, and “guerre 
revolutionnaire” and “the cost-benefit analysis of 
counterinsurgency”, the conventional view of the nexus 
between illicit economies and military conflict holds that 
belligerent groups derive large financial profits from illegal 
activities.
2
 These profits fund increases in the military 
                                                 
1
 Randal C. Archibold, “Despite Violence, U.S. Firms Expand in 
Mexico,” New York Times, July 10, 2011. 
2
  For government analyses exemplifying this view, see, for example, 
Rand Beers, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs, “Narco-Terror: The Worldwide Connection 
Between Drugs and Terrorism,” Testimony before the U.S. Senate 
Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and 
Government Information, March 13, 2002; 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=196; and Robert Charles, 
“U.S. Policy and Colombia,” Testimony before the House Committee on 
Government Reform, June 17, 2004, 
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http://reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/State%20-
%20Charles%20Testimony.pdf. For academic narcoterrorism works, see, 
for example, Rachel Ehrenfeld, How Terrorism Is Financed and How to 
Stop It (Chicago: Bonus Books, 2005);  Douglas J. Davids, Narco-
terrorism (Ardsley: Transnational Publishers, 2002); James Adams, The 
Financing of Terror (London: New English Library, 1986); Grant 
Wardlaw, “Linkages between the Illegal Drugs Traffic and Terrorism,” 
Conflict Quarterly, VIII (3), Summer 1988: 5-26; and Stefan Leader and 
David Wiencek, “Drug Money: The Fuel for Global Terrorism,” Jane’s 
Intelligence Review, February 2000: 49-54. See also, Rollie Lal, “South 
Asian Organized Crime and Terrorist Networks, “ Orbis, 49 (2), Spring 
2005: 293-304; Chris Dishman, “Terrorism, Crime, and Transformation,” 
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 42 (1), 2001: 43-58; and Tamara 
Makarenko, “The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay 
Between Transnational Crime and Terrorism,” Global Crime, 1 (1), 
2004: 129-145; and Svante Cornell, “Crime Without Borders,” Axess 
Magazine No. 6, 2004: 18-21, 
http://www.silkroadstudies.org/pub/0408Axess_EN.htm, downloaded 
January 8, 2005. 
The “greed versus grievance” scholars see economic motives – 
greed or loot-seeking –as the driver (or at minimum essential enabler) of 
civil wars; political grievances are no longer seen as the critical factor. 
For key works in “greed versus grievance,” see, Paul Collier and Anke 
Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in  Civil Wars,” October 21, 2001, 
http://econ.worldbank.org/files/12205_greedgrievance_23oct.pdf, 
downloaded April 16, 2003; Mats Berdal and David Keen, “Violence and 
Economic Agendas in Civil Wars: Some Policy Implications,” 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 26 (3), 1997: 795-818; 
Mats Berdal and David Malone eds., Greed and Grievance: Economic 
Agendas in Civil War (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000); David Keen, The 
Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars, Adelphi Paper No. 320 
(Oxford: IISS/Oxford University Press, 1998);   
The “guerre revolutionnaire” and “the cost-benefit analysis of 
counterinsurgency
 
emerged in the 1970s as a direct reaction to both the 
new guerrilla warfare manuals coming out, especially those of Mao, and 
to the failure of the previous French doctrine, oil stain or tache d’huile, in 
Indochina. Key theorists such as Georges Bonnet and Roger Trinquier 
created a counterinsurgency doctrine that sought to exploit the 
vulnerability of the initial phases of the insurgency and essentially 
resolved the contradiction between focusing on the physical resources of 
the belligerents and winning the hearts and minds in favor of destroying 
the belligerents‟ physical resources. See, Georges Bonnet, Les guerres 
insurrectionnelles et révolutionnaires (Paris: Payot, 1958), and Roger 
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capabilities of terrorists, warlords, and insurgents.  They 
correspondingly decrease the relative power of government 
forces. Consequently, governments should focus on 
eliminating the belligerents‟ physical resources by 
eliminating the illicit economies on which they rely. For 
example, former president of Colombia Álvaro Uribe has 
argued: “If Colombia would not have drugs, it would not 
have terrorists.”3 Or as World Bank official stated with 
reference to Colombia, “If we destroy the coca, there won‟t 
be any more war in Colombia.”4  
 
This conventional view is based on five key premises: 1) 
Belligerents make money from illicit economies. 2) The 
destruction of the illicit economy is both necessary and 
optimal for defeating the belligerents because it will 
critically reduce their resources. 3) The belligerents who 
participate in the illicit economy should no longer be treated 
as different from the criminals who also participate in the 
illicit economy. 4) Belligerents who participate in illicit 
                                                                                                    
Trinquier, Modern Warfare (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964).  Although 
not explicitly endorsing repression en masse, some American theorists of 
counterinsurgency also rejected the “hearts and minds” approach 
described below and focused on cutting off the provision of material 
supplies by the population to the insurgents. Charles Wolf, a leading 
author of what came to be known as the coercion theory or cost-benefit 
analysis of counterinsurgency, for example, argued that popular support 
was not essential for insurgents in developing countries, but rather the 
acquisition of material supplies by the insurgents from the population. 
See, Charles Wolf Jr., Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: New Myths 
and Old Realities, RAND Document, No. P-3132-1 (Santa Monica: 
RAND, 1965): 5.
 
3
 From a speech to the Organization of American States Permanent 
Council, Washington, DC, March 25, 2004, cited in International Crisis 
Group, War and Drugs in Colombia, Latin America Report No. 11, 
January 27, 2005: 9, 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/latin_america/11_war_and
_drugs_in_colombia.pdf, downloaded February 10, 2005.   
4
 Interviews with an official of the World Bank, Washington, DC, 
Summer 2003. 
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economies, such as the drug trade, lose political goals. 5) 
Criminals do not have political objectives. 
 
Analytical Approach II: The Political Capital of Illicit 
Economies 
The second analytical approach argues that belligerent 
groups obtain far more than simply increased physical 
resources from their participation in illicit economies. 
Informed by various academic critiques of the war on drugs, 
the hearts-and-minds view of counterinsurgency, 
“legitimacy” school of counterterrorism, and various 
criminological studies,
 5
 this approach has been most fully 
                                                 
5
  Various critiques of the war on drugs, see, for example, Peter Reuter 
“The Limits of Drug Control,” Foreign Service Journal, 79 (1), January 
2002: 18-23; Robert MacCoun and Peter Reuter, Drug War Heresies 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Eva Bertram, Morris 
Blachman, Kenneth Sharpe, and Peter Andreas, Drug War Politics: The 
Price of Denial  (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996); Ethan 
Nadelmann, “Drug Prohibition in the United States: Costs, 
Consequences, and Alternatives,” Science, (245), September 1989: 939-
47 and Ethan Nadelmann, “Commonsense drug policy,” Foreign Affairs, 
77 (1), January-February 1998: 111-26;  and Ted Galen Carpenter, Bad 
Neighbor Policy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), and C. Peter 
Rydell and Susan S. Everingham, Controlling Cocaine: Supply Versus 
Demand Programs (Santa Monica: RAND, 1994);  Rensselaer W. Lee 
III., The White Labyrinth (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 
1989) Cynthia McClintock, “The War on Drugs: The Peruvian Case,” 
Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 30 (2 and 3), 
Summer/ Fall 1988: 127-142; Richard Clutterbuck, Drugs, Crime, and 
Corruption (New York: New York University Press, 1995); Edgardo 
Buscaglia and William Ratliff, War and Lack of Governance in 
Colombia: Narcos, Guerrillas, and U.S. Policy (Stanford: Hoover 
Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 2001); Francisco Gutiérrez 
Sanín, “Criminal Rebels? A Discussion of Civil War and Criminality 
from the Colombian Experience,” Politics and Society, 32 (2), June 
2004: 257-285; Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin, eds., Drugs and 
Democracy in Latin America (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005). 
 
 The political capital of illicit economies builds upon the 
intellectual foundation of the hearts and minds approach to 
counterinsurgency. The many primarily British and American theorists of 
11 
 
                                                                                                    
this school of counterinsurgency placed their emphasis on the political 
aspect of the insurgent struggle – gaining legitimacy in the eyes of the 
population and depriving the government of its legitimacy -- and the 
consequent need on the part of the government to make the political 
effort, the legitimacy game, a similarly key aspect of counterinsurgency. 
The answer the HAM theorists proposed was to prevent the insurgents 
from winning the legitimacy game by supplying the population with the 
needed goods, restoring the government‟s capacity to provide them with 
basic services, improving standards of living, and reducing government 
abuse, brutality, and corruption. See, for example, Robert Thompson, 
Defeating Communist Insurgency (London: Chatto and Windus, 1966) 
and Robert Thompson, Revolutionary War in World Strategy, 1945-1969 
(London: Secker & Warburg, 1970); Frank Kitson, Low Intensity 
Operations (London: Faber & Faber, 1971); John S. Pustay, 
Counterinsurgency Warfare (New York: Free Press, 1965); David 
Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: 
Praeger, 1964); John J. McCuen, The Art of Revolutionary Warfare 
(London: Faber and Faber, 1966). For recent work in this vein, see John 
Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons 
from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005) 
and David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in 
the Midst of a Big One (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). My 
work has also been informed by the studies of peasant rebellions, 
including James C. Scott, The Moral Economy Peasant (New Haven: 
Yale University, 1976) and Eric Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth 
Century (New York, Harper & Row, 1969); Mancur Olson, The Logic of 
Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1965); Samuel L. Popkin, The Rational 
Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1979); Mark Lichbach, “What Makes 
Rational Peasants Revolutionary? Dilemma, Paradox, and Irony in 
Peasant Collective Action,” World Politics, 46 (2), April 1994: 383-418; 
Theda Skocpol, “What Makes Peasants Revolutionary?” Comparative 
Politics, 14 (3), April 1982: 351-75; Timothy Wickham-Crowley, 
Exploring Revolution: Essays on Latin American Insurgency and 
Revolutionary Theory (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1991); and T. David 
Mason and Dale A. Krane, “The Political Economy of Death Squads: 
Toward a Theory of the Impact of State-Sanctioned Terror,” 
International Studies Quarterly, 33 (2), 1989: 175-98. 
 For key works in the “legitimacy” school of terrorism, see, for 
example, Conor Cruise O‟Brien, “Terrorism under Democratic 
Conditions,” in Martha Crenshaw, ed., Terrorism, Legitimacy, and 
Power: The Consequences of Political Violence (Middletown: Wesleyan 
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articulated by the author in Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency 
and the War on Drugs.
6
 It argues that illicit economies 
provide an opportunity for belligerent groups to increase 
their power along multiple dimensions, not merely in terms 
of physical resources, but also by generating support from 
local populations.
7
 Indeed, as the first view emphasizes, with 
large financial profits from illicit economies, belligerent 
groups do improve their fighting capabilities by increasing 
their physical resources, hiring greater numbers of better 
paid combatants, providing them with better weapons, and 
simplifying their logistical and procurement chains. 
 
Crucially and frequently neglected in policy considerations, 
however, is the fact that large populations in Latin 
America in areas with minimal state presence, great 
poverty, and social and political marginalization are 
dependent on illicit economies, including the drug trade, 
for economic survival and the satisfaction of other socio-
economic needs. For many, participation in informal 
economies, if not outright illegal ones, is the only way to 
satisfy their basic livelihood needs and obtain any chance of 
social advancement, even as they continue to exist in a trap 
of insecurity, criminality, and marginalization. The more the 
State is absent or deficient in the provision of public goods – 
starting with public safety and suppression of street crime 
and including the provision of dispute-resolution 
mechanisms and access to justice, enforcement of contracts, 
and the provision of socio-economic public goods, such as 
infrastructure, access to health care, education, and legal 
employment – the more communities are susceptible to 
                                                                                                    
University Press, 1983): 91-104, and Richard E. Rubenstein, “The 
Noncauses of Modern Terrorism,” in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., ed. 
International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, and Controls (New 
York: St. Martin‟s 1990): 130. 
6
 Vanda Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on 
Drugs, Washington, DC: Brookings Press, 2009. 
7
 Ibid. 
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becoming dependent on and supporters of criminal entities 
and belligerent actors who sponsor the drug trade and other 
illegal economies.  
 
Such belligerents derive significant political capital – 
legitimacy with and support from local populations - from 
their sponsorship of the drug and other illicit economies, 
in addition to obtaining large financial profits. They do so 
by protecting the local population‟s reliable (and frequently 
sole source of) livelihood from the efforts of the government 
to repress the illicit economy. They also derive political 
capital by protecting the farmers (or in the case of other 
illicit commodities, the producers) from brutal and unreliable 
traffickers (bargaining with traffickers for better prices on 
behalf of the farmers), by mobilizing the revenues from the 
illicit economies to provide otherwise absent social services 
such as clinics and infrastructure, as well as other public 
goods, and by being able to claim nationalist credit if a 
foreign power threatens the local illicit economy. In short, 
sponsorship of illicit economies allows non-state armed 
groups to function as security providers and economic and 
political regulators. They are thus able to transform 
themselves from mere violent actors to actors that take on 
proto-state functions. 
 
Although the political capital such belligerents obtain is 
frequently thin, it is nonetheless sufficient to motivate the 
local population to withhold intelligence on the belligerent 
group from the government if the government attempts to 
suppress the illicit economy. Accurate and actionable human 
intelligence is vital for success in counterterrorist and 
counterinsurgency efforts as well as law enforcement efforts 
against crime groups. Although, as the evolution of the 
counterinsurgency campaigns in Colombia and Afghanistan 
during the 2000s show, human intelligence still critically 
facilitates counterinsurgency and anti-crime operations. 
14 
 
Four factors determine the range of political capital that 
belligerent groups obtain from sponsoring  the illicit 
economy: the state of the overall economy; the character of 
the illicit economy; the presence (or absence) of thuggish 
traffickers; and the government response to the illicit 
economy.   
 
1. The state of the overall economy – poor or rich - 
determines the availability of alternative sources of 
income and the number of people in a region who depend 
on the illicit economy for their basic livelihood.  
2. The character of the illicit economy – labor-intensive or 
not – determines the extent to which the illicit economy 
provides employment for the local population. The 
cultivation of illicit crops, such as of coca in Colombia or 
Peru, is very labor-intensive and provides employment to 
hundreds of thousands in a particular country. On the 
other hand, production of methamphetamines, such as 
that controlled by La Familia Michoacana (one of 
Mexico‟s drug trafficking organizations [DTO]), is not 
labor-intensive and provides livelihoods to fewer people. 
3. The presence of thuggish traffickers influences the extent 
to which the local population needs the protection of the 
belligerents against the traffickers.  
4. The government responses to the illicit economy (which 
can range from suppression to laissez-faire to rural 
development) determine the extent to which the 
population depends on the belligerents to preserve and 
regulate the illicit economy.  
 
In a nutshell, supporting the illicit economy will generate the 
most political capital for belligerents when the State of the 
overall economy is poor, the illicit economy is labor-
intensive, thuggish traffickers are active in the illicit 
economy, and the government has adopted a harsh strategy, 
15 
 
such as eradication, especially in the absence of legal 
livelihoods and opportunities.  
 
This does not mean that sponsorship of non-labor-intensive
8
 
illicit economies brings the anti-government belligerents or 
armed groups no political capital. If a non-labor-intensive 
illicit economy, such as drug smuggling in Sinaloa, Mexico, 
generates strong positive spillover effects for the overall 
economy by boosting demands for durables, nondurables, 
and services that would otherwise be absent, and hence 
indirectly providing livelihoods to and improved economic 
well-being of poor populations, it too can be a source of 
important political capital. In Sinaloa, for example, the drug 
trade is estimated to account for 20 percent of the state‟s 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and for some of Mexico‟s 
southern states, the number might be higher.
9
 Consequently, 
the political capital of the sponsors of the drug trade there, 
such as the Sinaloa cartel, is hardly negligible. Moreover, 
Mexico‟s DTOs also derive important political capital from 
their sponsorship and control of an increasing range of 
informal economies in Mexico.
10
 Similarly, the ability to 
provide better social services and public goods than the state 
has allowed Brazil‟s drug gangs to dominate many of 
Brazil‟s poor urban areas, such as in Rio de Janeiro (at least 
until the adoption of a government policy to pacify the 
favelas as Rio‟s slums are known). Criminal groups and 
belligerents can even provide socio-economic services, such 
as health clinics and trash disposal. 
                                                 
8
 For details on these concepts, see ibid., Chapter 2. 
9
 Guillermo Ibara in Manuel Roig-Franzia, “Mexico‟s Drug Trafficking 
Organizations Take Barbarous Turn: Targeting Bystanders,” Washington 
Post, July 30,2008, p. A9. 
10
 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “The Violent Drug Market in Mexico and 
Lessons from Colombia,” Foreign Policy at Brookings, Policy Paper No. 
12, March 2009; available from 
www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2009/03_mexico_drug_mar
ket_felbabbrown/03_mexico_drug_market_felbabbrown.pdf. 
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In addition, both criminal entities and belligerent groups 
often provide security. Although they are the source of 
insecurity and crime in the first place, they often regulate the 
level of violence and suppress street crime, such as 
robberies, thefts, kidnapping, and even homicides. Street 
crime in Latin America is very intensive, exhibiting one of 
the highest rates in the world. Thus, criminal groups that 
provide public order gain support from the community, in 
addition to facilitating their own illegal business since illicit 
economies too benefits from reduced transaction costs and 
increased predictability. 
 
Indeed, in many parts of Latin America, public safety has 
become increasingly privatized: with upper and middle 
classes relying on a combination of official law enforcement 
and legal and illegal private security entities, while 
marginalized segments rely on organized-crime groups to 
establish order on the street. Organized-crime groups and 
belligerent actors, such as the Primero Comando da Capital 
in Sao Paulo‟s shantytowns, also provide dispute resolution 
mechanisms and even set up unofficial courts and enforce 
contracts.
11
 The extent to which they provide these public 
goods varies, of course, but it often takes place regardless of 
whether the non-State entities are politically-motivated 
actors or criminal enterprises. The more they provide such 
public goods, the more they become de facto proto-State 
governing entities.  
 
Moreover, unlike their ideologies, which rarely motivate the 
wider population to support the belligerents, sponsorship of 
                                                 
11
 See, for example, Enrique Desmond Arias and Corrine Davis 
Rodrigues, “The Myth of Personal Security: Criminal Gangs, Dispute 
Resolution, and Identity in Rio de Janeiro‟s Favelas,” Latin American 
Politics, 48(4) 2006: 53-81; and Ben Pengalese, “The Bastard Child of 
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Culture‟ in Rio de Janeiro,” Luso-Brazilian Review, 45(1): 118-145. 
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illicit economies allows belligerent groups to deliver in real 
time concrete material improvements to the lives of 
marginalized populations. Their ability to deliver material 
benefits helps to preserve the belligerents‟ and criminal 
groups‟ political capital especially when ideology wanes, the 
brutality of the belligerents and criminal groups alienates the 
wider population, and other sources of support evaporate.  
 
This  ability also explains why even criminal groups without 
ideology can garner strong political capital. This effect is 
especially strong when the criminal groups also provide 
otherwise-absent order and minimal security. By being able 
to outcompete with the State in provision of governance, 
organized criminal groups can pose significant threats to the 
States in areas of weak or limited government presence.  
Consequently, the significance of whether a group‟s nature is 
criminal or political and whether belligerents are motivated 
by profit, ideology, or grievances are frequently overstated 
when devising policy responses. 
 
POLICY RESPONSES AND CONSIDERATIONS 
 
For Analytical Approach I, the dominant policy prescription 
for dealing with the nexus of illicit economies and conflict is 
the suppression of the illicit economy, such as through the 
eradication of illicit crops. (Although other means, such as 
alternative livelihoods programs, can be a part of the strategy 
to suppress the illicit economy, eradication tends to be by far 
the most dominant tool in this school of thought.)  This 
approach also argues for treating belligerents participating 
in illicit economies as criminals. That implies, for example, 
deemphasizing political and social solutions to conflict, 
such as negotiations or attempting to address their stated 
grievances. 
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Analytical Approach II does not emphasize the suppression 
of illicit economies for ending violent conflict; rather, it 
warns against the dangers of prematurely resorting to forced 
suppression of labor-intensive illicit economies and thus 
increasing the political capital of belligerent groups and even 
criminal entities. Instead, it argues for a sequenced and far 
more multifaceted approach. Among its key policy 
implications findings are: 
 
In cases where the State is weak and failing to delivery 
public goods, increased action by law enforcement 
agencies to suppress organized crime rarely is a sufficient 
response. Approaches such as mano dura  (hard line) 
policies, saturation of areas with law enforcement officers, 
especially if they are corrupt and inadequately trained, or the 
application of highly repressive measures rarely tend to be 
effective in suppressing organized crime and often only 
attack the symptoms of the social crisis, rather than its 
underlying conditions. 
 
Policies that focus on degrading the belligerents’ physical 
resources by attempting to destroy the illicit economy are 
frequently ineffective with respect to the objective of 
drying up the belligerents’ resources. In the case of labor-
intensive illicit economies where there are no legal economic 
alternatives in place, such policies are especially 
counterproductive with respect to securing intelligence and 
weaning the population away from the terrorists and 
insurgents.  
 
Eradication of illicit crops has dubious effects on the 
financial profits of belligerents. Even when carried out 
effectively, it might not inflict serious, if any, financial 
losses upon the belligerents since partial suppression of part 
of the illicit economy might actually increase the 
international market price for the illicit commodity. Given 
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continuing demand for the commodity, the final revenues 
might be even greater.  
 
Moreover, the extent of the financial losses of the 
belligerents also depends on the ability of the belligerents, 
traffickers, and farmers to store drugs, replant after 
eradication, increase the number of plants per acre, shift 
production to areas that are not subject to eradication, or use 
high-yield, high-resistance crops. Belligerents also have the 
opportunity to switch to other kinds of illicit economies such 
as synthetic drugs. Yet although the desired impact of 
eradication - to substantially curtail belligerents‟ financial 
resources - is far from certain and is likely to take place only 
under the most favorable circumstances, eradication will 
definitely increase the political capital of the belligerents 
since the local population will all the more strongly support 
the belligerents and will no longer provide the government 
with intelligence.  
 
Policies to interdict drug shipments or measures to counter 
money laundering, while not antagonizing the local 
populations from the government, are extraordinarily 
difficult to carry out effectively. Most belligerent groups 
maintain diversified revenue portfolios. Attempts to turn off 
their income are highly demanding of intelligence and are 
resource-intensive. Colombia provides one example where  
drug interdiction efforts in particular areas registered 
important tactical success against the FARC and reduced its 
income.  But such interdiction successes dependent on the 
military‟s ability to pin the FARC down in particular areas 
and prevent the FARC‟s frentes operating in coca areas from 
interacting with drug traffickers and frentes in non-coca 
areas. Indeed, it was the overall improvement in Colombia‟s 
military and its counterinsurgency policy, that was the 
critical reason for the vast improvements in security in the 
country and the success against the FARC. 
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Counterinsurgency or anti-organized crime policies that 
focus on directly defeating the belligerents and protecting 
the population tend to be more effective than policies that 
seek to do so indirectly by suppressing illicit economies as 
a way to defeat belligerents. Efforts to limit the 
belligerents‟ resources are better served by a focus on 
mechanisms that do not harm the wider population directly, 
even though such discriminate efforts are difficult to 
undertake effectively because of their resource intensiveness. 
 
In sum, counternarcotics policies have to be weighed very 
carefully, with a clear eye as to their impact on 
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. Seemingly quick 
fixes, such as blanket eradication in the absence of 
alternative livelihoods, will only strengthen the insurgency 
and compromise state-building, and ultimately the 
counternarcotics efforts themselves. 
 
Effectiveness in suppressing illicit economies is critically 
predicated on security. Without constant and intensive 
State presence and security, neither the suppression of 
illicit economies nor alternative livelihoods programs 
have been effective.  
 
It is also important to note that some alternative illicit 
economies, and new smuggling methods to which 
belligerents are pushed as result of suppression efforts 
against the original illicit economy, can have far more 
dangerous repercussions for State security and public 
safety than did the original illicit economy. Such 
alternative sources of financing could involve, for example, 
obtaining radioactive materials for resale on the black 
market. If true, reported efforts by the FARC to acquire 
uranium for resale in order to offset the temporary fall in its 
revenues as a result of eradication during early phases of 
Plan Colombia before coca cultivation there temporarily 
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rebounded, provide an example of how unintended policy 
effects in this field can be even more pernicious that the 
problem they are attempting to address.
12
 The FARC‟s 
switch to semisubmersibles for transportation of drugs is 
another worrisome example of unintended consequences of a 
policy, this time of intensified air and maritime interdiction. 
The more widespread such transportation technologies are 
among non-state belligerent actors, the greater the likelihood 
that global terrorist groups will attempt to exploit them for 
attacks against the U.S. homeland or assets. 
 
Similarly, in the absence of a reduction of global demand 
for narcotics, suppression of a narcotics economy in one 
locale will only displace production to a different locale 
where threats to local, regional, and global security 
interests may be even greater. Considerations of such 
second and third-degree effects need to be built into policy.  
 
An appropriate response would be a multifaceted State-
building effort that seeks to strengthen the bonds between the 
State and marginalized communities dependent on or 
vulnerable to participation in the drug trade for reasons of 
economic survival and physical insecurity. The goal of 
supply-side measures in counternarcotics efforts would be 
not simply to narrowly suppress the symptoms of illegality 
and State-weakness, such as illicit crops or smuggling, but 
more broadly and fundamentally to reduce the threat that the 
drug trade poses to human security, the State, and overall 
public safety.  
 
Effective State response to intense organized crime and 
illicit economies usually  requires addressing all the 
complex reasons why populations turn to illegality, 
including law enforcement deficiencies and physical 
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 Sybilla Brodzinsky, “FARC Acquired Uranium, Says Colombia,” 
Christian Science Monitor, March 28, 2008. 
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insecurity, economic poverty, and social marginalization.  
Such efforts entail ensuring that peoples and communities 
obey laws and that illegal behavior and corruption will be 
punished. An equally important component is creating a 
social, economic, and political environment in which the 
laws are consistent with the needs of the people and 
therefore, they are seen as legitimate and are internalized.  
 
In the case of efforts to combat illicit crop cultivation and the 
drug trade, one aspect of such a multifaceted approach that 
seeks to strengthen the bonds between the State and society 
and weaken the bonds between marginalized populations and 
criminal and armed actors would be the proper sequencing 
of eradication and the development of economic 
alternatives. Policies that emphasize eradication of illicit 
crops, including forced eradication, above rural development 
or that condition alternative livelihoods assistance programs 
on prior eradication of illicit crops, such as Colombia‟s so-
called zero-coca policies, have rarely been effective.
13
 Such 
sequencing and emphasis has also been at odds with the 
lessons learned from the most successful rural development 
effort in the context of illicit crop cultivation, Thailand.
14
 
Indeed, Thailand offers the only example where rural 
development succeeded in eliminating illicit crop cultivation 
on a country-wide level (even while drug trafficking and 
drug production of methamphetamines continue). 
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Colombia, Narino,” Brookings Institution Foreign Policy Trip Reports 
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 See, for example, Ronald D. Renard, Opium Reduction in Thailand, 
1970-2000: A Thirty-Year Journey (Bangkok: UNDCP Silkworm Books, 
2001) and Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy, Opium: Uncovering the Politics of 
Poppy (London: I.B. Taurus, 2009): 63-93. 
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Effective rural development does require not only proper 
sequencing of security, alternative livelihoods development, 
but also a well-funded, long-lasting, and comprehensive 
approach that does not center merely on searching for a 
replacement crop. Alternative development efforts need to 
address all the structural drivers of why communities 
participate in illegal economies -- such as poor access to 
legal markets, deficiencies in infrastructure and irrigation 
systems, no access to legal microcredit, and the lack of 
value-added chains.  
 
But the economic approaches to reducing illegality and 
crime should not be limited only to rural areas: there is 
great need for such programs in urban areas afflicted by 
extensive and pervasive illegality where communities are 
vulnerable to capture by organized crime, such as in 
Mexico or Brazil. Often the single most difficult problem is 
the creation of jobs in the legal economy, at times requiring 
overall GDP growth. But GDP growth is often not sufficient 
to generate jobs and lift people out of poverty as long the 
structural political-economic arrangements stimulate capital-
intensive growth, but not job creation – a common feature in 
Latin America, and one that only increases inequality. 
 
It is important that social interventions are designed as 
comprehensive rural development or comprehensive 
urban planning efforts, not simply limited social 
handouts or economic buyoffs. The latter approaches have 
failed – whether they were conducted in Medellín as a part of 
the demobilization process of the former paramilitaries 
(many of whom have returned as bandas criminales)
15
 or in 
Rio de Janeiro‟s favelas.16  
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Trip Reports No. 20, February 14, 2011, 
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The handout and buyoff shortcuts paradoxically can even 
strengthen criminal and belligerent entities. Such buyoff 
approach can set up difficult-to-break perverse social 
equilibria where criminal entities continue to control 
marginalized segments of society while striking a let-live 
bargain with the State, under which criminal actors even 
control territories and limit State access. 
 
Effectiveness of law enforcement efforts to combat 
organized crime is enhanced if interdiction policies are 
designed to diminish the coercive and corruption power 
of criminal organizations, rather than merely and 
predominantly to stop illicit flows. The former objective 
may mandate different targeting strategies and intelligence 
analysis. Predominant focus on the latter objective often 
weeds out the least capacious criminal groups, giving rise to 
a vertical integration of the crime industry and “leaner and 
meaner” criminal groups. 
 
An effective multifaceted response by the State also entails 
other components:  
 
 Addressing street crime to restore communities‟ 
associational capacity and give a boost to legal 
economies;  
 Providing access to dispute resolution and justice 
mechanisms – Colombia‟s casas de justicia are one 
example;  
 Encouraging protection of human rights, 
reconciliation, and nonviolent approaches;  
                                                                                                    
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0214_colombia_crime_felbabb
rown.aspx. 
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 Enrique Desmond Arias, “Trouble en Route: Drug Trafficking and 
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 Improving access to effective education as well as 
health care – a form of investment in human capital;  
 Insulating informal economies from takeover by the 
state and limiting the capacity of criminal groups to 
become polycrime franchises; 
 And creating public spaces free of violence and 
repression so that civil society can recreate its 
associational capacity and social capital. 
 
Boosting the capacity of communities to resist coercion 
and cooptation by criminal enterprises, however, does 
not mean that the State can rely on communities 
themselves to tackle crime, especially violent organized 
crime. In fact, there is a great deal of danger in the State 
attempting to mobilize civil society to take on crime 
prematurely while still incapable of assuring protection of 
the community and its leaders. Without the State‟s ability to 
back up communities and protect them from retaliatory 
violence, the population will not provide intelligence to the 
State. Moreover, unless the needed backup is provided when 
criminal and belligerent groups retaliate harshly against the 
community, the community can all the more sour on the 
State. It will then be very hard for the State to mobilize civil 
society the second time around and restore trust in its 
capacity and commitment.  
 
Whether as a result of organized criminal groups‟ warfare or 
as a side-effect of crime suppression policies, intense 
violence quickly eviscerates associational and organizational 
capacity and the social action potential of communities. Even 
if the drug traffickers or maras (gangs) are killing each other, 
intense violence on the streets hollows out the communities. 
Success hinges on the State‟s ability to bring violence down: 
without a reduction in violence, socio-economic 
interventions do not have a chance to take off and even 
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institutional reforms become difficult to sustain as political 
support weakens. 
 
THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S POLICY TOWARD 
ILLICIT ECONOMIES AND ORGANIZED CRIME IN 
LATIN AMERICA 
 
The Obama Administration has unequivocally acknowledged 
joint responsibility for efforts to suppress the drug trade and 
the threats it poses to national states and local 
communities.
17
  Even though U.S. funding for demand 
reduction measures has been increased only modestly, the 
Obama Administration has clearly committed itself to 
reducing the demand in the United States.
18
 A robust and 
well-funded commitment to demand reduction not only 
reduces consumption, but also greatly facilitates the 
effectiveness of supply-side measures. As long as there is a 
strong demand for illicit narcotics, supply-side measures 
cannot be expected to stop supply and eliminate 
consumption. 
 
The Obama Administration has also embraced a multifaceted 
approach to dealing with organized crime and illicit 
economies. Indeed, a focus on reinforcing the relationship 
between marginalized communities in Mexico‟s cities, such 
as Cuidad Juárez, and the State is now the fourth pillar of the 
new orientation of the Mérida Initiative, Beyond Merida. 
The other three pillars of the reoriented strategy include: 
moving away from high-value targeting of DTO capos to a 
more comprehensive interdiction effort that targets the entire 
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drug organization and giving newly trained police forces the 
primary street security function once again while gradually 
putting the military in a background support function; 
building a secure, but smart U.S.-Mexico border that also 
facilitates trade; and building up Mexico‟s civilian capacity. 
The fourth pillar – focused on weaning the population away 
from the drug traffickers - seeks to build resilient 
communities in Mexico to prevent their takeover by Mexican 
crime organizations.
19
 
 
Such U.S. policy meshes with the policy of the government 
of Mexico, which has also recognized the need to 
complement its law enforcement strategy with effective 
socio-economic programs to break the bonds of Mexico‟s 
poor and marginalized communities with the criminal 
groups. Through urban development initiatives such as 
Todos Somos Juárez, the Mexican government hopes to 
persuade Mexican citizens who are deeply dissatisfied with 
the violence that it can better provide them with public goods 
and social services than the drug traffickers can. The effort 
also aims to restore hope for underprivileged Mexicans – 20 
percent of Mexicans live below the extreme poverty line and 
at least 40 percent of the Mexican economy is informal – that 
a better future and possibility of social progress lies ahead if 
they remain in the legal economy. Such bonds between the 
community and the State will in the end allow the State to 
prevail in weakening crime.  But they are very hard to 
implement – especially given the structural deficiencies of 
Mexico‟s economy.  Accordingly, President Felipe Calderón 
has unveiled a host of social programs oriented toward 
bringing jobs, education, and public spaces to Ciudad Juarez. 
How swiftly and effectively these programs will be 
implemented remains to be seen. 
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Such a multifaceted approach with emphasis on social 
policies as a way to mitigate crime is increasingly resonating 
in Latin America. Socio-economic programs, such as Virada 
Social in Sao Paulo or the socio-economic component of 
Rio‟s favela’s pacification policy have been embraced by 
State governments in Brazil. In Colombia, President Juan 
Manuel Santos has initiated a range of socio-economic 
programs.
20
 And the U.S. government, too, has emphasized 
social programs, including rural development and alternative 
livelihoods.
21
 
 
The Obama Administration has also recognized the danger 
of the balloon effect in counternarcotics policies and the 
possibility that intensified law enforcement efforts in Mexico 
risk increasing drug shipment flows and associated threats to 
the states and societies in Central America and the 
Caribbean. There is already evidence that the presence of 
Mexican DTOs has greatly increased in Central America, 
posing severe security and corruption threats to local 
governments. To mitigate the spillover effects, the Obama 
Administration has unveiled two new initiatives: the Central 
American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) and the 
Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI).   
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CONTINUING CHALLENGES AND THE EFFECTS OF 
LOCAL INSTITUTIONAL AND CULTURAL SETTINGS 
ON POLICY EFFECTIVENESS 
 
Despite the above-described evolution toward some joint 
understanding and approaches, some areas of divergence and 
contention and important implementation challenges persist.  
 
Legalization and Decriminalization 
The Latin-American Commission on Drugs and Democracy, 
co-chaired by former presidents Fernando Henrique Cardoso, 
César Gaviria, and Ernesto Zedillo, called for a major 
rethinking of counternarcotics policies in Latin America and 
important changes to the international counternarcotics 
regime.
22
 Among other issues, it called for a public health 
approach to drug use and at least some decriminalization 
beyond personal-use possession decriminalization already 
adopted in many Latin American countries. Former Mexican 
President Vicente Fox similarly called for the 
decriminalization and even legalization of cannabis in 
Mexico.
23
 These positions, however, are hardly uniformly 
prevalent in Latin America. Mexican President Felipe 
Calderón, for example, has come out against such 
liberalization and legalization moves, as has at times the 
government of Colombia. 
 
Substantial liberalization of counternarcotics policy also has 
been at odds with the position of the United States 
government. When the state of California was considering 
the legalization of cannabis production, sales, and 
consumption, the federal government repeatedly stated that it 
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opposed such a move. Nonetheless, California‟s law on 
medical marijuana de facto decriminalizes marijuana use: 
Users without a medical prescription face minimal 
consequences under law and law enforcement suppression of 
marijuana cultivation in the state tends to focus on large-
scale cultivation by major drug trafficking organizations, 
such as Mexican drug trafficking groups operating in 
California.
24
 
 
Moreover, it is important to recognize that effects of policy 
changes on drugs and crime are inherently difficult to 
predict. Advocates of cannabis legalization, for example, 
argue that such a policy would improve the quality of life of 
users, deprive drug trafficking organizations of critical 
resources, augment state resources, reduce drug-related 
violence, and free law enforcement to focus on other priority 
law enforcement areas. But whether such effects would 
indeed materialize would depend on a host of factors, 
including the State‟s capacity to prevent drug trafficking 
organizations from taxing legal production, the intensity of 
the resulting turf wars over other illegal and informal 
economies, and policy reverberations in other countries‟ 
drug markets.
25
 Moreover, evidence from other issue areas, 
such as logging and the cigarette trade, shows that even 
economies around legal commodities can be pervaded by 
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violence, organized crime, and corruption.
26
 Evaluations of 
policy alternatives thus need to take cognizance of the 
limited knowledge of and weak predictive capacity about the 
effects of anti-crime and anti-narcotics policies.  
 
In reviewing and comparing the anti-narcotics and anti-crime 
policies of different countries and devising response 
strategies it is also important to take into account the 
significance of context. Drug use patterns as well as 
counternarcotics policies frequently reflect specific 
institutional and cultural settings; and the transferability of 
models may be limited. Many harm reduction programs in 
the Netherlands, for example, are embedded in an 
institutional and social context of extensive social services 
where the majority of population has very good access to 
health care. Such policies may face difficulties if 
implemented in countries that lack sufficient social 
services.
27
 Similarly, although proponents of 
decriminalization of personal use of illicit substances 
frequently do so on the basis that such a policy will reduce 
the burden on law enforcement and harms to users, whether 
such outcomes in fact take place also depend on context. In 
Brazil, for example, the evidence suggests that at least in 
some places, corrupt police used decriminalization of 
possession to threaten users with imprisonment by charging 
them with possession of greater than permitted amounts 
unless the users paid a bribe. Corrupt police units also used 
the law to solidify control of drug distribution networks in 
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Brazil. Neither was a desirable effect of the policy.
28
  
Although a one-shoe-fits-all policy approach particularly 
needs to be guarded against in the field of drug policy and 
anti-crime strategies, there is value in learning from the 
experience of other countries or regions in dealing with 
drugs, illicit economies, crime, and public health issues as 
long as proper weight is accorded to context.  
 
Demand Reduction 
The need for adopt strong demand reduction measures is no 
longer limited to Western countries, such as the United 
States or Western Europe. In fact, in many countries in Latin 
America, such as Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico (as well as 
outside of Latin America, such as in Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
Russia, and China) demand for illicit narcotics has greatly 
increased over the past twenty years.
29
 In some of these 
countries, including in Latin America, the per capita 
consumption of illicit narcotics rivals and even surpasses that 
of the United States or Western European countries. 
However, prevention and treatment programs often tend to 
be lacking and assigned low policy priority.
30
 At the same 
time, demand reduction programs often suffer from poor 
design and implementation not grounded in the best 
available scientific knowledge. 
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Balloon Effect 
Regional coordination and the sharing of best practices can 
mitigate the dangers of displacing illicit economies and 
organized crime to new locales. Nonetheless, in the absence 
of a significant reduction in demand, drug supply and 
transshipment will inevitably relocate somewhere. Thus, 
there is a limit to what regional efforts can accomplish. As 
long as there is weaker law enforcement and State-presence 
in one area than in others, the drug trade will relocate there.  
 
Moreover, areas with very weak State and law enforcement 
capacity and high levels of corruption often have constrained 
capacity to constructively absorb external assistance. Worse 
yet, such assistance risks being perverted: in the context of 
weak State capacity and high corruption, there is a 
substantial chance that counternarcotics efforts to train anti-
organized crime units will only end up training more 
effective and technologically-savvy drug traffickers. The 
best assistance in such cases may be to prioritize on 
strengthening the capacity to fight street crime, reduce 
corruption, and increase the effectiveness of the justice 
system. Once such assistance has been positively 
incorporated, it may be fruitful to focus on further anti-
organized crime efforts, including through advanced-
technology transfers and training specialized 
counternarcotics and anti-organized crime units. 
 
Concentration of Anti-Crime Resources 
A concentration of resources, both non-corrupt law 
enforcement forces and socio-economic programs to 
strengthen communities, often improves the chances that the 
State will succeed in such complex undertakings. However, 
it is often very hard politically to concentrate resources and 
tackle organized crime neighborhood- by- neighborhood and 
illegal economies municipality- by- municipality. In electoral 
democracies where governments have limited fiscal capacity 
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and constrained social spending budgets, government 
officials may find it especially hard to explain why a 
particular community provides comprehensive State social 
interventions and resources while other communities go 
lacking although they too are in acute need for law 
enforcement provision and social development. Both 
Mexico, such as in its Todos Somos Juárez  program, and 
Colombia in the Consolidation Programs of the Santos 
administration to coordinate and integrate its 
counterinsurgency, counternarcotics, and social development 
efforts have been struggling with such geographical 
prioritizations. The desire of governments to be reelected 
often encourages spreading resources to secure more votes. 
But spreading resources over extensive areas – as much as 
they may be acutely in need of intervention – without 
achieving a necessary law enforcement and socio-economic 
development momentum in any place greatly augments the 
chances of failure. 
 
Police Reform 
Police reform efforts constitute a particular challenge in 
Latin America. In many countries, attempts at police reform 
efforts since the 1980s have not been effective.  Law 
enforcement remains deeply eviscerated, deficient in 
combating street and organized crime, and corrupt.  
 
Reforming police that were used as a repressive apparatus of 
an authoritarian State is considerably different from 
reforming police forces that are deeply penetrated by 
organized crime and corrupt, with the latter being 
particularly challenging.  Chile provides an example of 
effective police reform of the former kind, Colombia of the 
latter.
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Police reform often requires a sustained commitment over a 
generation and a comprehensive design that include:  
building elite specialized anti-crime units, increasing the 
numbers of police and improving their training, changing the 
basis of promotion in police forces, designating the use of 
violence and deadly force by police as the last resort, and 
expanding police exchanges with local communities and 
expert groups – to name just a few components. Reducing 
corruption in the police forces and expanding their 
investigative capacity are imperative for increasing their 
effectiveness in combating organized crime and for 
improving relations with local communities. Nonetheless, 
both represent difficult components of police reform, 
especially during times of intense criminal violence when 
law enforcement tends to become overwhelmed or apathetic, 
and all the more susceptible to corruption. 
 
  
Judicial and Prison Reform 
Police reform is of limited effectiveness if the justice and 
corrections systems are lacking in capacity and/or riddled 
with corruption. Increased effectiveness of law enforcement 
is crucially correlated with increased prosecution capacity. In 
the absence of effective prosecutions, criminals sent to 
prisons and subsequently released become only more 
hardened and capable criminals. Poor correction systems 
often facilitate the formation of organized criminal groups: 
Rio de Janeiro‟s notorious Comando Vermelho, for example, 
originated in prisons. 
 
Justice system reforms have experienced some remarkable 
improvements in Latin America. Colombia‟s justice system, 
for example, has become far more capacious than it was 
twenty years ago; and innovative policies, such as Casas de 
                                                                                                    
eds., Public Security and Police Reform in the Americas (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005). 
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Justicia, have extended access to formal justice sectors to 
segments of Colombian society that previously were unable 
to avail themselves  of formal dispute resolution mechanisms 
and redress of grievances. Other countries in Latin America, 
such as Mexico, have moved away from their traditional 
inquisitorial systems of justice and adopted accusatorial 
models to improve the speediness and effectiveness of their 
criminal prosecution and to reduce corruption. But 
implementation of such reforms continues to be a major 
challenge and the resulting outcomes tend to be very context-
dependent. In Guatemala, the effectiveness of the UN-
facilitation mechanism to boost the effectiveness of 
Guatemala‟s justice system, the International Commission 
against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), continues to be 
challenged by persisting penetration of justice sector 
institutions by organized crime and other corruption. 
 
Thus, despite some promising developments, the capacity of 
justice system in Latin America continues to be lacking and 
large segments of Latin American populations do not have 
access to or confidence in formal justice systems. Like the 
justice-system sector, correction systems in Latin America 
also require urgent attention.  Brazil has been experimenting 
with some policy changes for its prison setups, but their 
effectiveness has not yet been established. Undertaking 
effective reform in this sector tends to be very challenging, 
and greater attention and knowledge-based policy design is 
urgently needed. 
 
Illegal Arms Trade 
Facing intense crime-related violence, many Latin American 
countries have called for strong efforts to combat the illegal 
trade in small arms, much of which originate in the United 
States. U.S. gun laws are very permissive and encourage 
high prevalence of small arms in U.S. society. In turn, they 
facilitate gun smuggling. 
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The Obama Administration has recognized the joint 
responsibility for combating the illegal weapons trade and 
has undertaken a number of initiatives and measures, such as 
reducing illegal weapons flow southward from the United 
States. However, the permissiveness of U.S. gun regulations 
makes it difficult for even intensified law enforcement to 
greatly increase the percentage of weapons flows 
interdicted.
32
  It also makes the burden of proof very 
onerous, complicating the chance for effective prosecution. 
Moreover, as in drug interdiction, the paradoxical effect of 
intensified interdiction is to significantly increase profits for 
gun smuggling, thus motivating new innovative smugglers to 
enter the illegal market. Furthermore, the illegal market in 
small arms is fully integrated globally and even if the United 
States was able to greatly reduce weapons flows, other 
suppliers, in the absence of worldwide controls on arms 
smuggling, would step in. 
 
It is also important to note that violence in criminal markets 
is not predominantly driven by the prevalence of small arms, 
although its patterns undoubtedly are. Small arms are very 
prevalent in the U.S, yet violent crime rates tend to be far 
smaller in the United States than in many Latin American 
countries (though arguably, they might be even lower if the 
controls on small-arms possession were stronger). The same 
international drug trafficking organizations, such as Mexican 
groups, that do not shy away from quick resort to arms 
against rivals and against local enforcement units in Latin 
America act with a far greater restraint in the United States. 
Thus, the deterrent capacity and strength of law enforcement 
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 Eric Olson, “Challenges and Opportunities for the U.S. and Mexico to 
Disrupt Firearms Trafficking to Mexico,” Testimony before Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Western 
Hemisphere, Peace Corps, and Narcotics Affairs, A Shared 
Responsibility: Counternarcotics and Citizens’ Security in the Americas, 
March 31, 2011. 
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(or the lack of it) and the effectiveness of the justice sector 
critically impacts violent behavior and crime-related 
violence more than weapons prevalence.  
 
The deterrent effect of law enforcement and internal criminal 
market dynamics, such as the strategic calculus of criminal 
groups and their ability to establish a balance of power in 
their territories, tend to be more powerful determinants of 
strategic violence in criminal markets. Evidence suggests, 
however, that the prevalence of small arms importantly 
impacts the levels of unpremeditated violent crime and the 
escalation of street crime and domestic disputes into 
weapons crime. When Sao Paulo, for example, undertook 
weapons collections drives in its shantytowns after Brazil 
greatly tightened its weapons laws, the resort to violence in 
street disputes significantly declined.
33
 However, strategic 
warfare among organized drug trafficking organizations in 
Sao Paulo, never as intense as in Rio de Janeiro‟s favelas, 
continued. At the same time, gun-smuggling became more 
vertically integrated in Sao Paulo and conducted by 
professional organized groups, while mom-and-pop-type 
enterprises were eliminated from the market.
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Anti-Money laundering Measures 
Officials in both the United States and Latin America have 
keenly focused on using anti-money- laundering efforts 
(AML) to bankrupt DTOs. As drug-related violence in 
Mexico has escalated, for example, Mexico‟s President 
Felipe Calderón has repeatedly suggested that if the United 
States did more to stop money flows to Mexico--including 
bulk cash flows--Mexican DTOs would be significantly 
weakened. Mexico has been debating whether to toughen its 
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 Author‟s interviews with conflict-reduction NGOs in Sao Paulo, 
Brazil, January 2010. 
34
 Author‟s interviews with criminologists and anti-gun NGOs in Sao 
Paulo, January 2010. 
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AML measures, such as to limit transactions conducted with 
cash and ATM withdrawals and to increase bank due-
diligence and reporting requirements.
35
 
 
Historically, the United States has emphasized AML 
mechanisms in its counternarcotics, anti-crime, and 
counterterrorism approaches and insisted that many Latin 
American countries embrace stringent AML policies. The 
United States, for example, helped Colombia adopt an 
extensive anti-money-laundering regime in the 1990s that is 
widely regarded as a model of very comprehensive AML 
regulation. Similarly, during the 2000s, the United States 
emphasized counterterrorism objectives in its demand that 
Caribbean countries close down their off-shore financial 
havens and adopt the same due-diligence requirements as 
financial businesses located on U.S. territory, or else risk 
being prosecuted for violating U.S. anti-terrorism laws or be 
blacklisted by the United Nations and other international 
anti-money-laundering regimes. (Many of the island 
financial centers have objected that the supposed 
counterterrorism objective of the AML measures has been 
merely a cloak to level the playing field for U.S. business, 
with dubious effects on financial flows to terrorist groups.)
36
  
 
However, the level of effectiveness of AML measures 
remains unclear, and is often highly contingent on specific 
susceptibilities of the target. Thus, there is a great variation 
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in the effectiveness of AML efforts to constrain dictators, 
bankrupt rogue regimes, such as North Korea and Iran, 
deprive terrorist groups of financing, and weaken criminal 
groups. For example, U.S. officials believe that U.S. efforts 
to deprive the al Qaeda terrorist organization of money, and 
stop especially its very visible financial flows from major 
companies in the Middle East and possibly from other semi-
legal ventures, such as African diamond trade, have been 
highly effective.
37
  
 
But such success appears to remain more of an exception 
than a standard outcome. Overall, efficacy rates of AML are 
rarely assumed to surpass 2-5 percent of laundered flows.
38
 
Money-launderers have a large menu of options at their 
disposal, such as cash smuggling, currency exchange 
bureaus, front companies, purchase of real estate, securities, 
trusts, casinos, and wire transfers to name a few.  
 
In the case of Colombia, despite robustness of the regulatory 
regime, AML measures seemed to contribute little to 
reducing the attractiveness of the drug trade and other illegal 
ventures for drug trafficking organizations or to weaken the 
groups‟ operational capacity. Direct interdiction measures – 
such as arrests of key traffickers and DTO‟s middle layer – 
seemed to have a far more pronounced effect in weakening 
the drug trafficking groups and reducing their capacity to 
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corrupt and coerce. Although Colombia‟s banking system 
appears to have been cleaned up from intense penetration by 
drug money that characterized it in the 1980s, informal 
banking and money laundering systems emerged and have 
been used by criminal groups.
39
 Penetration of illicit 
proceeds belonging to paramilitary groups and post-
paramilitary bandas criminales into Colombia‟s political 
system and overall economy also appears to continue 
unabated. 
 
AML measures, however, have other benefits than only the 
promise of reducing financial flows to belligerent actors. 
Intelligence developed by following the money can 
illuminate the extent of the target network and supplement 
other sources of intelligence, facilitating physical interdiction 
operations. Like Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (RICO) laws, which establish culpability 
on the basis of merely belonging to a prohibited 
organization, AML legislation can facilitate prosecutions on 
the basis of the AML law itself when evidence is not 
available to prosecute criminals for predicate crimes. 
 
However, stringent AML measures adopted without a careful 
consideration of the full scope of their impact can have 
undesirable side-effects. Apart from the alleged effect of 
putting businesses at a competitive disadvantage, they can in 
fact reinforce the informal economy in a country by pushing 
everyday legal transactions from the formal banking system 
into an informal one, along with illegal transactions. In Latin 
American countries, where the informal economy often 
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equals the size of the legal economy and where fiscal 
capacity of the state is very limited, such a reduction of the 
formal economy can be more detrimental overall to the State 
than the presence of illegal monies in the overall economy. 
AML measures thus need to be designed in ways to also 
reinforce and enlarge the formal economy. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Efforts to strengthen the State in Latin America will facilitate 
what local governments can accomplish against organized 
crime. An indispensible component of State-strengthening 
capacity in Latin America is reforming the law-and-order 
apparatus and the justice sector so that it can provide public 
safety and rule of law for all of its citizens. But States in 
Latin America would be more effective in combating 
transnational organized crime if they also focused more on 
combating street crime. This would provide new 
opportunities for cooperation with the United States, where 
innovative local community-policing programs have been 
experiencing considerable success in recent years. The 
needed comprehensive law-enforcement and justice-sector 
reforms would involve expanding police presence and 
limiting police corruption, brutality, and abuse as well as 
more strongly emphasizing community policing. 
 
The governments in Latin America are also likely to become 
more effective in combating crime if they intensify their 
focus on the socio-economic issues that underlie key aspects 
of criminality and informal and illegal economies in Latin 
America. Expanding economic and social opportunities for 
underprivileged marginalized populations can facilitate 
community cooperation against organized crime. If the 
manifestation of the State becomes benevolent by providing 
legal economic opportunities for social development and 
legitimate and reliable security and justice, many root causes 
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of transnational crime would be addressed, and belligerent 
and crime organizations delegitimized. Latin American 
citizens would become both far less interested in 
participating in illicit economies and far more willing to 
participate with the State in tackling transnational crime. 
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